The growing controversy over government flood-control projects has created a dangerous impression: that perhaps the Philippines would be better off without flood-control spending altogether.
That would be the wrong conclusion.
What needs to be stopped is not flood-control infrastructure.
What needs to be stopped is the failure to follow the rules governing how these projects are planned, funded, constructed, inspected, and paid for.
House Deputy Speaker Janette Garin is right to call for the restoration of legitimate flood-control and shoreline-protection projects in the proposed 2027 national budget—but under a much tougher system of validation, monitoring, and accountability.
Communities that regularly suffer from overflowing rivers, storm surges, high tides and heavy monsoon rains cannot simply be told that flood-control projects are being suspended because some projects have been accused of irregularities.
That would punish the people who need protection most.
The more sensible approach is simple:
Keep the good projects. Reject the questionable ones. And make every project pass through a microscope.
There is, after all, nothing inherently wrong with a properly conceived flood-control project.
A river needs to be managed. A vulnerable shoreline needs protection. A community repeatedly inundated by floodwaters needs infrastructure.
These are legitimate government responsibilities.
The problem begins when what was approved on paper is different from what is eventually constructed on the ground.
This is where the Program of Works becomes extremely important.
A government project is not supposed to be an open-ended construction activity where specifications can be casually changed along the way.
The approved plans, technical specifications, quantities, measurements, location, materials, structural requirements and corresponding costs provide the roadmap.
Follow that roadmap.
If the Program of Works says a structure should be a certain length, build that length.
If it specifies a particular thickness, build it to that thickness.
If it requires a particular type and volume of concrete or reinforcement, use those specified materials.
If the project is intended to protect a particular area, construct it where the approved engineering assessment says protection is needed.
And if circumstances on the ground genuinely require a change, document it, justify it technically and secure the necessary approval.
That is not rocket science.
It is basic project management, engineering discipline and public accountability.
Garin herself pointed to the importance of clearly defining project boundaries, exact measurements, technical specifications, on-site inspections and independent monitoring.
Those safeguards should not merely be additional requirements whenever controversy erupts.
They should be standard practice for every major government infrastructure project.
The same principle should apply to every DPWH project—not just flood-control works.
Roads, bridges, drainage systems, seawalls, slope protection, public buildings and other infrastructure all have approved plans and specifications.
The government knows what it intends to build.
The contractor knows what it has been contracted to build.
The implementing agency knows what it is supposed to inspect.
The question is whether everybody actually follows the documents.
If the answer is yes, then there is no reason to fear legitimate infrastructure spending.
If the answer is no, then the people responsible should be identified and held accountable.
This is why allegations involving ghost projects, substandard construction, nonexistent structures, or projects built in the wrong location should be thoroughly investigated.
But the investigation should lead to better implementation—not the abandonment of infrastructure programs that communities genuinely need.
There is also a lesson here for Congress.
Budget amendments should not become an opportunity to insert projects without proper technical validation. If a project is added, modified or transferred, there should be a clear justification and a transparent paper trail.
As Garin pointed out, conditions can change.
A river can change course.
A landslide can alter a community’s risk profile.
A previously safe area can become a danger zone.
A structure can collapse.
These realities may require modifications.
But legitimate changes should never be confused with arbitrary changes.
There is a world of difference between an engineering revision supported by facts and an alteration made simply to accommodate somebody’s interest.
That distinction must be protected.
And contractors who repeatedly deliver substandard work should not simply be given another contract after another contract.
If violations are established through proper proceedings, blacklisting should be seriously considered.
Government contracts should reward competence and integrity—not connections.
Perhaps the most important point raised in this debate is that public infrastructure must never become a commodity.
Government projects are not merchandise.
They are not political favors.
They are not assets to be traded.
They are investments made with taxpayers’ money for the protection and improvement of communities.
So let us not make the mistake of throwing away the entire flood-control program because some projects may have been abused.
Instead, throw out the abuse.
Throw out ghost projects.
Throw out padded quantities.
Throw out substandard materials.
Throw out fictitious accomplishments.
Throw out questionable insertions.
Throw out contractors who, after due process, are proven to have violated government requirements.
But do not throw out the flood-control projects that a flood-prone community genuinely needs.
The Philippines is an archipelago regularly battered by typhoons and monsoon rains. Flood-control infrastructure will remain necessary for as long as communities remain vulnerable to flooding.
The answer, therefore, is not less flood control.
It is better flood control.
And better flood control begins with something very basic:
Follow the approved Detailed Engineering Design. Follow the Program of Works. Follow the technical specifications. Measure what was actually built. Inspect it properly. Pay only for actual accomplishment. Document every legitimate change. And hold accountable anyone who deliberately violates the rules.
If those principles are followed down to the letter, there is nothing inherently wrong with flood-control projects—or with other DPWH infrastructure projects for that matter.
The concrete is not the problem.
The bridge is not the problem.
The seawall is not the problem.
The drainage canal is not the problem.
The problem is what happens when the rules governing their construction are ignored.
That is where the microscope should be pointed.
And that is where accountability must begin.
